Radical Restructuring of India's Security Architecture
The Union Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram had proposed radical restructuring of the security architecture at the national level. He unveiled the proposal while delivering the 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture. The topic of the lecture was “A New Architecture of India’s Security”.
As part of the plan, the Home Minister said that India must be able to set up the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) by the end of 2010 and once set up, NCTC must have the broad mandate to deal with all kinds of terrorist violence, directed against the country and its people.
The Home Minister also suggested restructuring of the Ministry of Home Affairs and said that the Home Minister should devote the whole of his time and energy to matters relating to security.
Following is the text of his lecture, which is hailed as one of the best piece of speech in the recent times by a political leader :
“The Intelligence Bureau is 122 years old. It celebrated its centenary in the year 1987. Since 1988, a number of distinguished persons – political leaders, scientists, jurists, police officers and administrators – have delivered the Centenary Endowment Lecture. I find that the subjects chosen by the speakers covered a wide range. I confess that I toyed with the idea of speaking on something totally unrelated to the security establishment. However, I thought that discretion was the better part of valour and settled on a subject that is, I hope, both contemporary and futuristic. I thank Shri Rajiv Mathur, Director, Intelligence Bureau for inviting me to deliver this prestigious lecture.
Violence is Omnipresent
Humankind has, through the millennia, co-existed with violence. Hunting and gathering were marked by violence. Tribal groups employed violence to assert their authority over land to the exclusion of other tribal groups. Kingdoms were established by violence; kings were overthrown by violence. War was invariably an instrument of policy: to be a warrior was an honour and great kings were also great warriors. In the twentieth century alone, humankind witnessed two world wars and many smaller wars. About 15 million people were killed in the first World War. Nearly 60 million died in the second World War. In all the conflicts since 1945, it is estimated that nearly 30 million persons may have been killed.
It is only in the latter half of the twentieth century that the seeds were sown for a movement against war. The famous words of Pope John XXIII come to mind: “No more war, never again war.” Nevertheless, little wars were fought over territories or boundaries. Fierce civil wars were fought, and are being fought, within countries. Nations joined together to fight a despot or eject an invader or quell a rebellion. As I speak to you, there is an “official” war in Afghanistan and many more unofficial battles. A world free from war appears to be a distant dream.
While accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, the President of the United States and the Commander-in-Chief of the world’s mightiest armed forces said: “We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.”
Can war be justified? It is a debatable point. Those who justify war point to the larger objectives of a war. That was the case in the Balkans, that was the case in Iraq, and that is the case in Afghanistan. The jury is still out.
Through the twentieth century, many small wars were waged within countries. In Russia and in China, war took the name of “armed liberation struggle” in order to liberate the country from the yoke of capitalism and usher in the so-called rule of the proletariat. The main driver was ideology. Stripped of the rhetoric, it is plain that such conflicts were also driven by the desire to establish the supremacy of a leader or a party. Such ideology-driven internal wars led to the establishment of one-party States such as in China, Vietnam and Cuba.
After the second World War, there was another kind of war. It was called the Cold War. It was fought not with armies or aircraft or ships. It was fought in the shadowy world of espionage and intrigue. Its soldiers were agents and double agents. Its objectives were not very different from the objectives of a regular war. The ultimate goal was military supremacy over other countries of the world. It is said that the Cold War came to an end with the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, but that was not the end of all wars. Just as the Cold War came to an end, we witnessed the emergence of another kind of war, namely, jihad.
Jihad is a war or struggle against unbelievers and, currently, it is waged by a number of groups owing allegiance to Islam. Unlike the original Crusades, jihad is not fought like a conventional war. Jihad employs terror as an instrument to achieve its objectives. Such terror is directed against all and sundry, its victims are usually innocent people, and its goal is to overawe and overthrow the established authority. The tactics of the jihadis have been copied by militants belonging to other groups too, not excluding militants professing the Hindu faith.
By a quirk of fate, India in the twenty-first century has turned out to be the confluence of every kind of violence: insurrection or insurgency in order to carve out sovereign States; armed liberation struggle motivated by a rejected ideology; and terrorism driven by religious fanaticism. Never before has the Indian State faced such a formidable challenge. Never before have the Indian people been asked to prepare themselves for such fundamental changes in the manner in which the country will be secured and protected.
The Agony of 26/11
Let me summarize the situation as I found it on December 1, 2008. Two days after the terrorist attack in Mumbai was repulsed – after paying a heavy price of 164 lives – the nation was in shock and anger. A billion plus people felt they had been humiliated and the country had been brought to its knees by a small band of terrorists. The security establishment was in disarray and numerous questions were being asked. Had the intelligence agencies failed? Did the first responder, the Mumbai police, prove to be totally inadequate? Was the famed National Security Guard too slow to get off the block? Did the leadership of the police let down its men? Did the security forces take too long to neutralise ten terrorists? Did the Central and the State Governments fail to provide strong leadership? Did the crisis management system collapse? Did the country pay too heavy a price before it repulsed the terrorist attack? Did the Government fail the people in not mounting a swift counter-attack on the perpetrators of terror?
These questions continue to haunt me and many others even today. I think I have found the answers to some of these questions, but I do not intend to fill this lecture with those answers. My purpose is to outline the broad architecture of a new security system that will serve the country today and in the foreseeable future.
The State of our Police
Let me begin with the foot soldiers. All the States and Union Territories put together had a sanctioned strength of 1,746,215 policemen as on January 1, 2008. Against that number, only 1,478,888 policemen were in place. There are 13,057 police stations and 7,535 police posts in the country. The ratio of available police to per 100,000 people for the whole country is about 130. The international average is about 270. There is no substitute for the policeman who walks the streets. He is the gatherer of intelligence, the enforcer of the law, the preventer of the offence, the investigator of the crime and the standard-bearer of the authority of the State, all rolled into one. If he is not there, it means that all these functions are not performed. That – the failure to perform essential police functions – is where the rot began and that is where the rot lies even today. The first step, therefore, in devising a new security system in the country is to recruit more policemen and policewomen. In my estimate, States would have to recruit over 400,000 constables this year and in the next two years in order to fill the vacancies and in order to provide for expansion of the police forces. A bad police constable is worse than no police constable. Recruitment must therefore be transparent, objective and corruption-free. The Central Government has devised and commended to the States a transparent recruitment procedure that will be totally technology-based and free of any human interference. On its part, the Central Government has implemented the new procedure in the recruitment to the Central Para Military Forces.
The police stations in the country are, today, virtually unconnected islands. Thanks to telephones and wireless, and especially thanks to mobile telephones, there is voice connectivity between the police station and senior police officers, but that is about all. There is no system of data storage, data sharing and accessing data. There is no system under which one police station can talk to another directly. There is no record of crimes or criminals that can be accessed by a Station House Officer, except the manual records relating to that police station. Realising the gross deficiency in connectivity, the Central Government is implementing an ambitious scheme called “Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS).” The goals of the system are to facilitate collection, storage, retrieval, analysis, transfer and sharing of data and information at the police station and between the police station and the State Headquarters and the Central Police Organisations.
If intelligence-gathering is the corner stone of fighting insurgency or insurrection or terror, the foot solider cannot work in isolation. He must be enabled to gather intelligence from the people as well as the representatives and quasi-representatives of the State such as the Sarpanch, the Lambardar, the village accountant etc. More often than not, intelligence is provided by the citizen who would wish to remain faceless and nameless. It is therefore important that State Governments adopt “Community Policing” and establish a toll-free service under which a citizen can provide information or lodge a complaint. It is the myriad bits of information flowing from different sources that, when sifted, analysed, matched, correlated and pieced together, become actionable intelligence. That function must be performed, first and foremost, at the police station.
To sum up, we must have more police stations and, at the police station level, we must have more constables, some of whom are exclusively for gathering intelligence. We must also have a system of community policing, a toll-free service, and a network to store, retrieve and access data relating to crimes and criminals.
Moving up the ladder, at the District and State levels, the Special Branch is the key to better intelligence and more intelligence-based operations. There should be at least one police officer in each police station exclusively for intelligence gathering. As the intelligence gathered flows up to the District Special Branch and State Special Branch, there should be an adequate number of well-trained analysts to analyse the intelligence and to draw the correct conclusions. Intelligence is a specialised function. Not every police officer is qualified to be an intelligence officer. It is therefore imperative that the State Special Branch should be restructured as a specialised and self-sufficient cadre of the State police in terms of personnel, funds and equipment. On January 7, 2009, the Central Government had circulated a proposal to restructure the Special Branch in the State police forces. The implementation of the proposal will mark the beginning of a long-haul effort to restructure the intelligence-gathering machinery at the District and State levels.
At the District and State levels, the police must also be the first responder in case of a militant or terrorist attack. 24 x 7 control rooms must be set up at the District and State levels. Quick Response Teams must be positioned in every district capital and in important towns. Commando units must be raised and placed at different locations. The Central Government is supporting and funding the conversion of two companies of selected IR Battalions into commando units. QRT and commando units should have modern weapons and equipment. The age profile of these units must be young and older men must, periodically, make way for younger men. A special Anti-Terrorist Unit should be created at the State level to pre-empt terrorist activities and investigate terrorist crimes. While States have begun to take steps on these matters, the pace is still slow. States must give a full and true picture of the tasks completed by them and their state of readiness to face any threat or attack.
The Difficult Tasks Ahead
From what I have said so far, the changes that are required to be made in the architecture are quite basic and simple. They can be done by providing more funds, tightening the administration and working to a time-bound plan. Of course, it will also require sound leadership at the political and police levels. However, when we move upwards, serious questions concerning constitutional responsibilities and division of powers will arise. Also, difficult questions would have to be posed and answered regarding the current responsibilities of different organisations. Questions concerning jurisdiction and turf would also arise. If our goal is just extracting a little more from the ‘business as usual’ model, then these questions can be brushed aside or provided ‘don’t-rock-the-boat’ answers. I am afraid that would be self-defeating. Sooner than you think, there may be another crisis like the hijack of IC-814 or another catastrophe like the Mumbai terror attacks. Hence, the time to act is now and I would spell the last word with capitals: N-O-W.
I therefore propose a bold, thorough and radical restructuring of the security architecture at the national level.
The present architecture consists of political, administrative, intelligence and enforcement elements. At the political level, there is the Cabinet Committee on Security. The administrative element is the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Prime Minister’s office and the Cabinet Secretariat. The intelligence elements are spread over different ministries: there is the Intelligence Bureau which reports to the Home Minister; there is the Research and Analysis Wing which falls under the Cabinet Secretariat and, hence, reports to the Prime Minister; there are organisations such as Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and Aviation Research Centre (ARC) which report to the National Security Adviser; and there is the National Security Council Secretariat under the NSA which serves the National Security Council. The armed forces have their own intelligence agencies, one each under the Army, Navy and Air Force and an umbrella body called the Defence Intelligence Agency. There are other agencies which specialise in financial intelligence. These are the Directorates in the Income Tax, Customs and Central Excise departments, the Financial Intelligence Unit, and the Enforcement Directorate. The enforcement element of this architecture consists of the central para-military forces such as CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP, Assam Rifles, SSB and the NSG. What will strike any observer is that there is no single authority to which these organisations report and there is no single or unified command which can issue directions to these agencies and bodies.
Some changes have indeed been brought about after December 1, 2008. The most beneficial change has been the operationalisation of the Multi-Agency Centre. By an Executive Order issued on December 31, 2008, the MAC was energised with a broader and compulsory membership and a new mandate. Every piece of relevant information or intelligence gathered by one of the participating agencies is brought to the table. It is analysed and the analysis is shared with the participating agencies. The key benefit is that no one can say that his/her organisation was kept in the dark. Another beneficial change has been the extension of the reach of MAC to the State capitals and the setting up of the Subsidiary-MAC in each State capital in which all agencies operating at the State level, especially the Special Branch of the State police, are represented. Through the MAC-SMAC-State Special Branch network, the Intelligence Bureau has been able to pull more information and intelligence from the State capitals. It has also been able to push more information and intelligence into the State security system.
Another innovation is the security meeting held every day, around noon, under the Chairmanship of the Home Minister. NSA, Home Secretary, Secretary (R&AW), DIB, Chairman, JIC, and Special Secretary (IS) attend the meeting. The broad directions issued at the end of the meeting have brought about better coordination in all aspects of intelligence including gathering, analysing and acting upon the intelligence.
We should resist the temptation to exaggerate the gains that have been made through these changes at the top. The Home Minister – and by extension the Government – is indeed better informed. The agencies involved are more alert. However, in my view, it does not mean that our capacity to pre-empt or prevent a terrorist threat or attack has been enhanced significantly. As far as responding to a terrorist attack is concerned, we may have enhanced the capacity to contain and repulse an attack, but I think that there is still some distance to go before we can claim to have acquired the capacity to respond swiftly and decisively to a terror attack. It is this assessment which leads me to argue that the security architecture at the top must be thoroughly and radically restructured.
The New Architecture
Some steps in this direction are self-evident. For example, there is a need to network all the databases that contain vital information and intelligence. Today, each database stands alone. It does not talk to another database. Nor can the ‘owner’ of one database access another database. As a result, crucial information that rests in one database is not available to another agency. In order to remedy the deficiency, the Central Government has decided to set up NATGRID. Under NATGRID, 21 sets of databases will be networked to achieve quick, seamless and secure access to desired information for intelligence/enforcement agencies. This project is likely to be completed in 18 – 24 months from now.
Two more projects will commence early next year. The first is the Business Process Re-engineering of the Foreigners Division at a cost of about Rs.20 crore. The second is the more ambitious Mission Mode Project on Immigration, Visa and Foreigners’ Registration and Tracking with the objective of creating a secure and integrated service delivery framework for facilitating legitimate travellers and strengthening security. The scheme will network 169 missions, 77 ICPs, 5 FRROs and over 600 FROs with the Central Foreigners’ Bureau. It is estimated to cost Rs.1011 crore, but the rub is it is slated to be implemented over a period of four and a half years. The gaps in the visa system have been exposed in a number of cases, the most notable among them being the case of David Coleman Headley. The compelling need to create a fool-proof system cannot be overstated. Hence, it is necessary to put the project on a fast track, engage a Mission Director, beg or borrow the money to implement the project, and complete the task within 24 months.
It is our experience that the networks of terror overlap with the networks of drug-peddling, arms-trading and human-trafficking. The agencies that deal with the latter category of crimes are scattered. For example, the Narcotics Control Bureau is under the Ministry of Home Affairs while the Central Bureau of Narcotics is under the Ministry of Finance. The Arms Act is administered by MHA. As far as human-trafficking is concerned, the primary responsibility lies with the State Governments, but anti-human trafficking cells have been set up only in 9 districts of the country. Regulation and enforcement in each of these areas require to be strengthened and brought under the overall management of internal security.
The Way Forward – NCTC
Another major idea is the proposal to set up the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). As the name suggests, the goal is to counter terrorism. Obviously, this will include preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place, and responding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators. Such an organisation does not exist today. It has to be created from scratch. I am told that the United States was able to do it within 36 months of September 11, 2001. India cannot afford to wait for 36 months. India must decide now to go forward and India must succeed in setting up the NCTC by the end of 2010.
Once NCTC is set up, it must have the broad mandate to deal with all kinds of terrorist violence directed against the country and the people. While the nature of the response to different kinds of terror would indeed be different and nuanced, NCTC’s mandate should be to respond to violence unleashed by any group – be it an insurgent group in the North East or the CPI (Maoist) in the heartland of India or any group of religious fanatics anywhere in India acting on their own or in concert with terrorists outside India. NCTC would therefore have to perform functions relating to intelligence, investigation and operations. All intelligence agencies would therefore have to be represented in the NCTC. Consequently, in my proposal, MAC would be subsumed in the NCTC. Actually, MAC with expanded authority will be at the core of the new organisation and will transform itself into NCTC. The functions that will be added to the current functions of MAC are investigation and operations. As far as investigation is concerned, Government has set up the National Investigation Agency, and that agency would have to be brought under the overall control of NCTC. The last function – operations – would of course be the most sensitive and difficult part to create and bring under the NCTC. But I am clear in my mind that, without ‘operations’, NCTC and the security architecture that is needed will be incomplete. It is the proposed ‘operations’ wing of the NCTC that will give an edge – now absent – to our plans to counter terrorism.
The establishment of the NCTC will indeed result in transferring some oversight responsibilities over existing agencies or bodies to the NCTC. It is my fervent plea that this should not result in turf wars. Some agencies would naturally have to be brought under NCTC and what come to my mind readily are NIA, NTRO, JIC, NCRB and the NSG. The positioning of R&AW, ARC and CBI would have to be re-examined and a way would have to be found to place them under the oversight of NCTC to the extent that they deal with terrorism. The intelligence agencies of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance would, of course, continue to remain under the respective Ministry, but their representatives would have to be deputed mandatorily to the NCTC. NATGRID would obviously come under NCTC. So also, CCTNS would have to be supervised by the NCTC.
Given the overarching responsibility of NCTC and its mandate, it will be obvious that it must be headed by a highly qualified professional with vast experience in security related matters. Considering the structure of our services, it is natural to expect that the head of one of our organisations will be appointed to the post, by whatever name it may be called. He/she could be a police officer or a military officer. He/she must be one who has impeccable professional credentials and the capacity to oversee intelligence, investigation and operations. He/she will be the single person accountable to the country on all matters relating to internal security. At the Government level, and in order to be accountable to Parliament, it would be logical and natural to place the NCTC under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
That leaves the question of the structure of the Ministry of Home Affairs itself. MHA now handles a wide portfolio of subjects ranging from ‘freedom fighters’ to ‘forensic science’. Is this a functional arrangement to deal with the grave challenges to internal security that we face and that we will face from many more years? I am afraid not. It is true that the words ‘Ministry of Home Affairs’ have an authoritative ring, but the MHA now performs a number of functions that have no direct relation to internal security. For example, it has a division dealing with freedom fighters but it does not have even a desk for dealing exclusively with forensic science. There are other divisions or desks that deal with Centre-State Relations, State Legislation, Human Rights, Union Territories, Disaster Management, Census etc. These are undoubtedly important functions and deserve close attention. However, internal security is an equally, if not more, important function that deserves the highest attention. In my view, given the imperatives and the challenges of the times, a division of the current functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs is unavoidable. Subjects not directly related to internal security should be dealt with by a separate Ministry or should be brought under a separate Department in the MHA and dealt with by a Minister, more or less independently, without referring every issue to the Home Minister. The Home Minister should devote the whole of his/her time and energy to matters relating to security.
It is after one year in office that I have ventured to outline the new architecture for India’s security. There are two enemies of change. The first is ‘routine’. Routine is the enemy of innovation. Because we are immersed in routine tasks, we neglect the need for change and innovation. The second enemy is ‘complacency’. In a few days from today, 2009 will come to a close, and I sincerely hope that we may be able to claim that the year was free from terror attacks. However, there is the danger of a terror-free year inducing complacency, signs of which can be seen everywhere. A strange passivity seems to have descended upon the people: they are content to leave matters relating to security to a few people in the Government and not ask questions or make demands. I wish to raise my voice of caution and appeal to all of you assembled here, and to the people at large, that there is no time to be lost in making a thorough and radical departure from the present structure. If, as a nation, we must defend ourselves in the present day and prepare for the future, it is imperative that we put in place a new architecture for India’s security.
Thank you for your patience and courtesy.” Read More!
As part of the plan, the Home Minister said that India must be able to set up the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) by the end of 2010 and once set up, NCTC must have the broad mandate to deal with all kinds of terrorist violence, directed against the country and its people.
The Home Minister also suggested restructuring of the Ministry of Home Affairs and said that the Home Minister should devote the whole of his time and energy to matters relating to security.
Following is the text of his lecture, which is hailed as one of the best piece of speech in the recent times by a political leader :
“The Intelligence Bureau is 122 years old. It celebrated its centenary in the year 1987. Since 1988, a number of distinguished persons – political leaders, scientists, jurists, police officers and administrators – have delivered the Centenary Endowment Lecture. I find that the subjects chosen by the speakers covered a wide range. I confess that I toyed with the idea of speaking on something totally unrelated to the security establishment. However, I thought that discretion was the better part of valour and settled on a subject that is, I hope, both contemporary and futuristic. I thank Shri Rajiv Mathur, Director, Intelligence Bureau for inviting me to deliver this prestigious lecture.
Violence is Omnipresent
Humankind has, through the millennia, co-existed with violence. Hunting and gathering were marked by violence. Tribal groups employed violence to assert their authority over land to the exclusion of other tribal groups. Kingdoms were established by violence; kings were overthrown by violence. War was invariably an instrument of policy: to be a warrior was an honour and great kings were also great warriors. In the twentieth century alone, humankind witnessed two world wars and many smaller wars. About 15 million people were killed in the first World War. Nearly 60 million died in the second World War. In all the conflicts since 1945, it is estimated that nearly 30 million persons may have been killed.
It is only in the latter half of the twentieth century that the seeds were sown for a movement against war. The famous words of Pope John XXIII come to mind: “No more war, never again war.” Nevertheless, little wars were fought over territories or boundaries. Fierce civil wars were fought, and are being fought, within countries. Nations joined together to fight a despot or eject an invader or quell a rebellion. As I speak to you, there is an “official” war in Afghanistan and many more unofficial battles. A world free from war appears to be a distant dream.
While accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, the President of the United States and the Commander-in-Chief of the world’s mightiest armed forces said: “We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.”
Can war be justified? It is a debatable point. Those who justify war point to the larger objectives of a war. That was the case in the Balkans, that was the case in Iraq, and that is the case in Afghanistan. The jury is still out.
Through the twentieth century, many small wars were waged within countries. In Russia and in China, war took the name of “armed liberation struggle” in order to liberate the country from the yoke of capitalism and usher in the so-called rule of the proletariat. The main driver was ideology. Stripped of the rhetoric, it is plain that such conflicts were also driven by the desire to establish the supremacy of a leader or a party. Such ideology-driven internal wars led to the establishment of one-party States such as in China, Vietnam and Cuba.
After the second World War, there was another kind of war. It was called the Cold War. It was fought not with armies or aircraft or ships. It was fought in the shadowy world of espionage and intrigue. Its soldiers were agents and double agents. Its objectives were not very different from the objectives of a regular war. The ultimate goal was military supremacy over other countries of the world. It is said that the Cold War came to an end with the fall of the Berlin wall on November 9, 1989, but that was not the end of all wars. Just as the Cold War came to an end, we witnessed the emergence of another kind of war, namely, jihad.
Jihad is a war or struggle against unbelievers and, currently, it is waged by a number of groups owing allegiance to Islam. Unlike the original Crusades, jihad is not fought like a conventional war. Jihad employs terror as an instrument to achieve its objectives. Such terror is directed against all and sundry, its victims are usually innocent people, and its goal is to overawe and overthrow the established authority. The tactics of the jihadis have been copied by militants belonging to other groups too, not excluding militants professing the Hindu faith.
By a quirk of fate, India in the twenty-first century has turned out to be the confluence of every kind of violence: insurrection or insurgency in order to carve out sovereign States; armed liberation struggle motivated by a rejected ideology; and terrorism driven by religious fanaticism. Never before has the Indian State faced such a formidable challenge. Never before have the Indian people been asked to prepare themselves for such fundamental changes in the manner in which the country will be secured and protected.
The Agony of 26/11
Let me summarize the situation as I found it on December 1, 2008. Two days after the terrorist attack in Mumbai was repulsed – after paying a heavy price of 164 lives – the nation was in shock and anger. A billion plus people felt they had been humiliated and the country had been brought to its knees by a small band of terrorists. The security establishment was in disarray and numerous questions were being asked. Had the intelligence agencies failed? Did the first responder, the Mumbai police, prove to be totally inadequate? Was the famed National Security Guard too slow to get off the block? Did the leadership of the police let down its men? Did the security forces take too long to neutralise ten terrorists? Did the Central and the State Governments fail to provide strong leadership? Did the crisis management system collapse? Did the country pay too heavy a price before it repulsed the terrorist attack? Did the Government fail the people in not mounting a swift counter-attack on the perpetrators of terror?
These questions continue to haunt me and many others even today. I think I have found the answers to some of these questions, but I do not intend to fill this lecture with those answers. My purpose is to outline the broad architecture of a new security system that will serve the country today and in the foreseeable future.
The State of our Police
Let me begin with the foot soldiers. All the States and Union Territories put together had a sanctioned strength of 1,746,215 policemen as on January 1, 2008. Against that number, only 1,478,888 policemen were in place. There are 13,057 police stations and 7,535 police posts in the country. The ratio of available police to per 100,000 people for the whole country is about 130. The international average is about 270. There is no substitute for the policeman who walks the streets. He is the gatherer of intelligence, the enforcer of the law, the preventer of the offence, the investigator of the crime and the standard-bearer of the authority of the State, all rolled into one. If he is not there, it means that all these functions are not performed. That – the failure to perform essential police functions – is where the rot began and that is where the rot lies even today. The first step, therefore, in devising a new security system in the country is to recruit more policemen and policewomen. In my estimate, States would have to recruit over 400,000 constables this year and in the next two years in order to fill the vacancies and in order to provide for expansion of the police forces. A bad police constable is worse than no police constable. Recruitment must therefore be transparent, objective and corruption-free. The Central Government has devised and commended to the States a transparent recruitment procedure that will be totally technology-based and free of any human interference. On its part, the Central Government has implemented the new procedure in the recruitment to the Central Para Military Forces.
The police stations in the country are, today, virtually unconnected islands. Thanks to telephones and wireless, and especially thanks to mobile telephones, there is voice connectivity between the police station and senior police officers, but that is about all. There is no system of data storage, data sharing and accessing data. There is no system under which one police station can talk to another directly. There is no record of crimes or criminals that can be accessed by a Station House Officer, except the manual records relating to that police station. Realising the gross deficiency in connectivity, the Central Government is implementing an ambitious scheme called “Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS).” The goals of the system are to facilitate collection, storage, retrieval, analysis, transfer and sharing of data and information at the police station and between the police station and the State Headquarters and the Central Police Organisations.
If intelligence-gathering is the corner stone of fighting insurgency or insurrection or terror, the foot solider cannot work in isolation. He must be enabled to gather intelligence from the people as well as the representatives and quasi-representatives of the State such as the Sarpanch, the Lambardar, the village accountant etc. More often than not, intelligence is provided by the citizen who would wish to remain faceless and nameless. It is therefore important that State Governments adopt “Community Policing” and establish a toll-free service under which a citizen can provide information or lodge a complaint. It is the myriad bits of information flowing from different sources that, when sifted, analysed, matched, correlated and pieced together, become actionable intelligence. That function must be performed, first and foremost, at the police station.
To sum up, we must have more police stations and, at the police station level, we must have more constables, some of whom are exclusively for gathering intelligence. We must also have a system of community policing, a toll-free service, and a network to store, retrieve and access data relating to crimes and criminals.
Moving up the ladder, at the District and State levels, the Special Branch is the key to better intelligence and more intelligence-based operations. There should be at least one police officer in each police station exclusively for intelligence gathering. As the intelligence gathered flows up to the District Special Branch and State Special Branch, there should be an adequate number of well-trained analysts to analyse the intelligence and to draw the correct conclusions. Intelligence is a specialised function. Not every police officer is qualified to be an intelligence officer. It is therefore imperative that the State Special Branch should be restructured as a specialised and self-sufficient cadre of the State police in terms of personnel, funds and equipment. On January 7, 2009, the Central Government had circulated a proposal to restructure the Special Branch in the State police forces. The implementation of the proposal will mark the beginning of a long-haul effort to restructure the intelligence-gathering machinery at the District and State levels.
At the District and State levels, the police must also be the first responder in case of a militant or terrorist attack. 24 x 7 control rooms must be set up at the District and State levels. Quick Response Teams must be positioned in every district capital and in important towns. Commando units must be raised and placed at different locations. The Central Government is supporting and funding the conversion of two companies of selected IR Battalions into commando units. QRT and commando units should have modern weapons and equipment. The age profile of these units must be young and older men must, periodically, make way for younger men. A special Anti-Terrorist Unit should be created at the State level to pre-empt terrorist activities and investigate terrorist crimes. While States have begun to take steps on these matters, the pace is still slow. States must give a full and true picture of the tasks completed by them and their state of readiness to face any threat or attack.
The Difficult Tasks Ahead
From what I have said so far, the changes that are required to be made in the architecture are quite basic and simple. They can be done by providing more funds, tightening the administration and working to a time-bound plan. Of course, it will also require sound leadership at the political and police levels. However, when we move upwards, serious questions concerning constitutional responsibilities and division of powers will arise. Also, difficult questions would have to be posed and answered regarding the current responsibilities of different organisations. Questions concerning jurisdiction and turf would also arise. If our goal is just extracting a little more from the ‘business as usual’ model, then these questions can be brushed aside or provided ‘don’t-rock-the-boat’ answers. I am afraid that would be self-defeating. Sooner than you think, there may be another crisis like the hijack of IC-814 or another catastrophe like the Mumbai terror attacks. Hence, the time to act is now and I would spell the last word with capitals: N-O-W.
I therefore propose a bold, thorough and radical restructuring of the security architecture at the national level.
The present architecture consists of political, administrative, intelligence and enforcement elements. At the political level, there is the Cabinet Committee on Security. The administrative element is the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Prime Minister’s office and the Cabinet Secretariat. The intelligence elements are spread over different ministries: there is the Intelligence Bureau which reports to the Home Minister; there is the Research and Analysis Wing which falls under the Cabinet Secretariat and, hence, reports to the Prime Minister; there are organisations such as Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and Aviation Research Centre (ARC) which report to the National Security Adviser; and there is the National Security Council Secretariat under the NSA which serves the National Security Council. The armed forces have their own intelligence agencies, one each under the Army, Navy and Air Force and an umbrella body called the Defence Intelligence Agency. There are other agencies which specialise in financial intelligence. These are the Directorates in the Income Tax, Customs and Central Excise departments, the Financial Intelligence Unit, and the Enforcement Directorate. The enforcement element of this architecture consists of the central para-military forces such as CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP, Assam Rifles, SSB and the NSG. What will strike any observer is that there is no single authority to which these organisations report and there is no single or unified command which can issue directions to these agencies and bodies.
Some changes have indeed been brought about after December 1, 2008. The most beneficial change has been the operationalisation of the Multi-Agency Centre. By an Executive Order issued on December 31, 2008, the MAC was energised with a broader and compulsory membership and a new mandate. Every piece of relevant information or intelligence gathered by one of the participating agencies is brought to the table. It is analysed and the analysis is shared with the participating agencies. The key benefit is that no one can say that his/her organisation was kept in the dark. Another beneficial change has been the extension of the reach of MAC to the State capitals and the setting up of the Subsidiary-MAC in each State capital in which all agencies operating at the State level, especially the Special Branch of the State police, are represented. Through the MAC-SMAC-State Special Branch network, the Intelligence Bureau has been able to pull more information and intelligence from the State capitals. It has also been able to push more information and intelligence into the State security system.
Another innovation is the security meeting held every day, around noon, under the Chairmanship of the Home Minister. NSA, Home Secretary, Secretary (R&AW), DIB, Chairman, JIC, and Special Secretary (IS) attend the meeting. The broad directions issued at the end of the meeting have brought about better coordination in all aspects of intelligence including gathering, analysing and acting upon the intelligence.
We should resist the temptation to exaggerate the gains that have been made through these changes at the top. The Home Minister – and by extension the Government – is indeed better informed. The agencies involved are more alert. However, in my view, it does not mean that our capacity to pre-empt or prevent a terrorist threat or attack has been enhanced significantly. As far as responding to a terrorist attack is concerned, we may have enhanced the capacity to contain and repulse an attack, but I think that there is still some distance to go before we can claim to have acquired the capacity to respond swiftly and decisively to a terror attack. It is this assessment which leads me to argue that the security architecture at the top must be thoroughly and radically restructured.
The New Architecture
Some steps in this direction are self-evident. For example, there is a need to network all the databases that contain vital information and intelligence. Today, each database stands alone. It does not talk to another database. Nor can the ‘owner’ of one database access another database. As a result, crucial information that rests in one database is not available to another agency. In order to remedy the deficiency, the Central Government has decided to set up NATGRID. Under NATGRID, 21 sets of databases will be networked to achieve quick, seamless and secure access to desired information for intelligence/enforcement agencies. This project is likely to be completed in 18 – 24 months from now.
Two more projects will commence early next year. The first is the Business Process Re-engineering of the Foreigners Division at a cost of about Rs.20 crore. The second is the more ambitious Mission Mode Project on Immigration, Visa and Foreigners’ Registration and Tracking with the objective of creating a secure and integrated service delivery framework for facilitating legitimate travellers and strengthening security. The scheme will network 169 missions, 77 ICPs, 5 FRROs and over 600 FROs with the Central Foreigners’ Bureau. It is estimated to cost Rs.1011 crore, but the rub is it is slated to be implemented over a period of four and a half years. The gaps in the visa system have been exposed in a number of cases, the most notable among them being the case of David Coleman Headley. The compelling need to create a fool-proof system cannot be overstated. Hence, it is necessary to put the project on a fast track, engage a Mission Director, beg or borrow the money to implement the project, and complete the task within 24 months.
It is our experience that the networks of terror overlap with the networks of drug-peddling, arms-trading and human-trafficking. The agencies that deal with the latter category of crimes are scattered. For example, the Narcotics Control Bureau is under the Ministry of Home Affairs while the Central Bureau of Narcotics is under the Ministry of Finance. The Arms Act is administered by MHA. As far as human-trafficking is concerned, the primary responsibility lies with the State Governments, but anti-human trafficking cells have been set up only in 9 districts of the country. Regulation and enforcement in each of these areas require to be strengthened and brought under the overall management of internal security.
The Way Forward – NCTC
Another major idea is the proposal to set up the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). As the name suggests, the goal is to counter terrorism. Obviously, this will include preventing a terrorist attack, containing a terrorist attack should one take place, and responding to a terrorist attack by inflicting pain upon the perpetrators. Such an organisation does not exist today. It has to be created from scratch. I am told that the United States was able to do it within 36 months of September 11, 2001. India cannot afford to wait for 36 months. India must decide now to go forward and India must succeed in setting up the NCTC by the end of 2010.
Once NCTC is set up, it must have the broad mandate to deal with all kinds of terrorist violence directed against the country and the people. While the nature of the response to different kinds of terror would indeed be different and nuanced, NCTC’s mandate should be to respond to violence unleashed by any group – be it an insurgent group in the North East or the CPI (Maoist) in the heartland of India or any group of religious fanatics anywhere in India acting on their own or in concert with terrorists outside India. NCTC would therefore have to perform functions relating to intelligence, investigation and operations. All intelligence agencies would therefore have to be represented in the NCTC. Consequently, in my proposal, MAC would be subsumed in the NCTC. Actually, MAC with expanded authority will be at the core of the new organisation and will transform itself into NCTC. The functions that will be added to the current functions of MAC are investigation and operations. As far as investigation is concerned, Government has set up the National Investigation Agency, and that agency would have to be brought under the overall control of NCTC. The last function – operations – would of course be the most sensitive and difficult part to create and bring under the NCTC. But I am clear in my mind that, without ‘operations’, NCTC and the security architecture that is needed will be incomplete. It is the proposed ‘operations’ wing of the NCTC that will give an edge – now absent – to our plans to counter terrorism.
The establishment of the NCTC will indeed result in transferring some oversight responsibilities over existing agencies or bodies to the NCTC. It is my fervent plea that this should not result in turf wars. Some agencies would naturally have to be brought under NCTC and what come to my mind readily are NIA, NTRO, JIC, NCRB and the NSG. The positioning of R&AW, ARC and CBI would have to be re-examined and a way would have to be found to place them under the oversight of NCTC to the extent that they deal with terrorism. The intelligence agencies of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance would, of course, continue to remain under the respective Ministry, but their representatives would have to be deputed mandatorily to the NCTC. NATGRID would obviously come under NCTC. So also, CCTNS would have to be supervised by the NCTC.
Given the overarching responsibility of NCTC and its mandate, it will be obvious that it must be headed by a highly qualified professional with vast experience in security related matters. Considering the structure of our services, it is natural to expect that the head of one of our organisations will be appointed to the post, by whatever name it may be called. He/she could be a police officer or a military officer. He/she must be one who has impeccable professional credentials and the capacity to oversee intelligence, investigation and operations. He/she will be the single person accountable to the country on all matters relating to internal security. At the Government level, and in order to be accountable to Parliament, it would be logical and natural to place the NCTC under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
That leaves the question of the structure of the Ministry of Home Affairs itself. MHA now handles a wide portfolio of subjects ranging from ‘freedom fighters’ to ‘forensic science’. Is this a functional arrangement to deal with the grave challenges to internal security that we face and that we will face from many more years? I am afraid not. It is true that the words ‘Ministry of Home Affairs’ have an authoritative ring, but the MHA now performs a number of functions that have no direct relation to internal security. For example, it has a division dealing with freedom fighters but it does not have even a desk for dealing exclusively with forensic science. There are other divisions or desks that deal with Centre-State Relations, State Legislation, Human Rights, Union Territories, Disaster Management, Census etc. These are undoubtedly important functions and deserve close attention. However, internal security is an equally, if not more, important function that deserves the highest attention. In my view, given the imperatives and the challenges of the times, a division of the current functions of the Ministry of Home Affairs is unavoidable. Subjects not directly related to internal security should be dealt with by a separate Ministry or should be brought under a separate Department in the MHA and dealt with by a Minister, more or less independently, without referring every issue to the Home Minister. The Home Minister should devote the whole of his/her time and energy to matters relating to security.
It is after one year in office that I have ventured to outline the new architecture for India’s security. There are two enemies of change. The first is ‘routine’. Routine is the enemy of innovation. Because we are immersed in routine tasks, we neglect the need for change and innovation. The second enemy is ‘complacency’. In a few days from today, 2009 will come to a close, and I sincerely hope that we may be able to claim that the year was free from terror attacks. However, there is the danger of a terror-free year inducing complacency, signs of which can be seen everywhere. A strange passivity seems to have descended upon the people: they are content to leave matters relating to security to a few people in the Government and not ask questions or make demands. I wish to raise my voice of caution and appeal to all of you assembled here, and to the people at large, that there is no time to be lost in making a thorough and radical departure from the present structure. If, as a nation, we must defend ourselves in the present day and prepare for the future, it is imperative that we put in place a new architecture for India’s security.
Thank you for your patience and courtesy.” Read More!
Urban Poverty in India: An Overview
Poverty is pernicious and distressing feature of an economy. Urban poverty is as acute and chronic as rural poverty in India. The policy makers of urban development should always accord highest priority to alleviate urban poverty and distress.
Urban India has a high incidence of poverty despite being hailed as an engine of growth and instrument of globalization. Eighty-one million people subsist in urban areas on incomes that are below the poverty line. The pace of urbanization in India is set to increase, and with it, urban poverty and urban slums. However, public policy measures for urban India have lacked focus and proper allocation of funds. There is thus an urgent need at the national level to document the key issues in urban poverty, to assess the tasks at hand, and plan for the future.
India will have 41% of the people living in urban areas by 2030 from the present level of 286 million and 28%.
The identification of beneficiaries is a challenge in cities. This is the basic reason of many poverty alleviating schemes getting skewed and eventually getting lost in the rich history of ‘failed’ policies. There is new hope that Unique Identification Authority of India (UAIA) would help in beneficiary identification for the effective delivery of the public services to the targeted group of the society.
There is urgent need for a mission mode approach to combat urban poverty. The upgradation of the skills and training is the basic necessity to revive the livelihoods of the urban poor in a sustainable way.
In Karnataka state, an innovative initiative, Rural Development and Self Employment Training Institute (RUDSETI) was taken way back since 1982 to motivate unemployed youth to take up self-employment as an alternative career. The unique experiment of building confidence of the youth by developing skill and positive attitude among them through dedicated training was found effective.
The model has proved very successful for the past 22 years in building the morale of the youth and empowering them to acquire a productive identity by taking up self-employment ventures in their own places.
The Institute conducts more than 50 types of training programmes, which are of short duration, ranging from 1 to 6 weeks. Keeping in view the fact that most of the unemployed youth are from poor/middle class rural families, who are already burdened financially, entire training is provided free of cost including free boarding and lodging.
Replication of the model was recommended in urban areas to tackle the unemployment problem successfully and developing entrepreneurship.
Education should always be made an integral part of urban development plans. The improved literacy levels among the poor would enable them to know more about their rights and empower them to fight against the bureaucratic red tape to access public services.
Health and nutrition aspects of is often neglected aspect of the urban policy makers. The rural poor have more institutional interventions in health and nutrition compared to their urban counterparts. Nearly 13% of the urban poor sufferings from serious ailments do not receive treatment in a timely and affordable manner. The concept of ‘Primary Health Care’ facilities should be made available to improve the treatments rates among the urban poor.
The concept of social banking is yet to take firm roots in the urban India.
Nearly 77% of the microcredit clients are in the rural sector and still the SHG-Bank Linkage model remains a rural phenomenon. The microfinance intermediaries tend to move towards urban centers when the rural market moves towards saturation point.
With a rapid urbanization on the anvil, the government should focus on sustainable and inclusive development of urban areas. India needs 30-40 world class cities to be able to compete in the dynamic and globalised world economy.
The intermittent interventions will always give intangible results apart from draining the critical financial resources.
There is a need for comprehensive, holistic and integral urban development plans to achieve the desired results. The basic necessity is the genuine empowerment of urban local bodies though effective devolution and decentralization.
An Update
As per the estimates of the Planning Commission, based on the Uniform Recall Period method, the number of urban poor population has increased from 76.34 million to 80.80 million during the years 1993-94 and 2004-05;
The Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation has brought out ‘India Urban Poverty Report 2009’ containing research papers/ academic papers on key facets of urban poverty such as economic development and urban poverty, gender dimensions of urban poverty, poverty and migration, unorganized sector and urban poverty, etc.
The Report, based on study findings, reveals that (i) rural migrants into urban areas have lower probability of being poor than the local population and (ii) among migrants, the incidence of poverty is higher for rural-urban migrants compared to urban-urban migrants.
The chapter in India Urban Poverty Report on “Gender Dimensions of Urban Poverty” observes that women in urban areas are affected due to poverty and gender discrimination.
The scheme of Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY), which has been comprehensively revamped with effect from 1.4.2009, is the major scheme for addressing the issues of urban poverty with focus on women.
The scheme has 5 major components:
(1) Urban Self Employment Programme (USEP)
(2) Urban Women Self-help Programme (UWSP)
(3) Skill Training for Employment Promotion amongst Urban Poor (STEP-UP)
(4) Urban Wage Employment Programme (UWEP)
(5) Urban Community Development Network (UCDN)
Urban Women Self-help Programme (UWSP) component under Swarna Jayanti Shahri Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) targets at:
Assistance to groups of urban poor women for setting up gainful self employment ventures – UWSP (Loan & Subsidy). Revolving Funds for Self-Help Groups (SHGs)/ Thrift & Credit Societies (T&CSs) formed by the urban poor women – UWSP (Revolving Fund).
Further, under the Guidelines of SJSRY, it is stipulated that the percentage of women beneficiaries under USEP and STEP-UP shall not be less than 30%. Read More!
Urban India has a high incidence of poverty despite being hailed as an engine of growth and instrument of globalization. Eighty-one million people subsist in urban areas on incomes that are below the poverty line. The pace of urbanization in India is set to increase, and with it, urban poverty and urban slums. However, public policy measures for urban India have lacked focus and proper allocation of funds. There is thus an urgent need at the national level to document the key issues in urban poverty, to assess the tasks at hand, and plan for the future.
India will have 41% of the people living in urban areas by 2030 from the present level of 286 million and 28%.
The identification of beneficiaries is a challenge in cities. This is the basic reason of many poverty alleviating schemes getting skewed and eventually getting lost in the rich history of ‘failed’ policies. There is new hope that Unique Identification Authority of India (UAIA) would help in beneficiary identification for the effective delivery of the public services to the targeted group of the society.
There is urgent need for a mission mode approach to combat urban poverty. The upgradation of the skills and training is the basic necessity to revive the livelihoods of the urban poor in a sustainable way.
In Karnataka state, an innovative initiative, Rural Development and Self Employment Training Institute (RUDSETI) was taken way back since 1982 to motivate unemployed youth to take up self-employment as an alternative career. The unique experiment of building confidence of the youth by developing skill and positive attitude among them through dedicated training was found effective.
The model has proved very successful for the past 22 years in building the morale of the youth and empowering them to acquire a productive identity by taking up self-employment ventures in their own places.
The Institute conducts more than 50 types of training programmes, which are of short duration, ranging from 1 to 6 weeks. Keeping in view the fact that most of the unemployed youth are from poor/middle class rural families, who are already burdened financially, entire training is provided free of cost including free boarding and lodging.
Replication of the model was recommended in urban areas to tackle the unemployment problem successfully and developing entrepreneurship.
Education should always be made an integral part of urban development plans. The improved literacy levels among the poor would enable them to know more about their rights and empower them to fight against the bureaucratic red tape to access public services.
Health and nutrition aspects of is often neglected aspect of the urban policy makers. The rural poor have more institutional interventions in health and nutrition compared to their urban counterparts. Nearly 13% of the urban poor sufferings from serious ailments do not receive treatment in a timely and affordable manner. The concept of ‘Primary Health Care’ facilities should be made available to improve the treatments rates among the urban poor.
The concept of social banking is yet to take firm roots in the urban India.
Nearly 77% of the microcredit clients are in the rural sector and still the SHG-Bank Linkage model remains a rural phenomenon. The microfinance intermediaries tend to move towards urban centers when the rural market moves towards saturation point.
With a rapid urbanization on the anvil, the government should focus on sustainable and inclusive development of urban areas. India needs 30-40 world class cities to be able to compete in the dynamic and globalised world economy.
The intermittent interventions will always give intangible results apart from draining the critical financial resources.
There is a need for comprehensive, holistic and integral urban development plans to achieve the desired results. The basic necessity is the genuine empowerment of urban local bodies though effective devolution and decentralization.
An Update
As per the estimates of the Planning Commission, based on the Uniform Recall Period method, the number of urban poor population has increased from 76.34 million to 80.80 million during the years 1993-94 and 2004-05;
The Ministry of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation has brought out ‘India Urban Poverty Report 2009’ containing research papers/ academic papers on key facets of urban poverty such as economic development and urban poverty, gender dimensions of urban poverty, poverty and migration, unorganized sector and urban poverty, etc.
The Report, based on study findings, reveals that (i) rural migrants into urban areas have lower probability of being poor than the local population and (ii) among migrants, the incidence of poverty is higher for rural-urban migrants compared to urban-urban migrants.
The chapter in India Urban Poverty Report on “Gender Dimensions of Urban Poverty” observes that women in urban areas are affected due to poverty and gender discrimination.
The scheme of Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY), which has been comprehensively revamped with effect from 1.4.2009, is the major scheme for addressing the issues of urban poverty with focus on women.
The scheme has 5 major components:
(1) Urban Self Employment Programme (USEP)
(2) Urban Women Self-help Programme (UWSP)
(3) Skill Training for Employment Promotion amongst Urban Poor (STEP-UP)
(4) Urban Wage Employment Programme (UWEP)
(5) Urban Community Development Network (UCDN)
Urban Women Self-help Programme (UWSP) component under Swarna Jayanti Shahri Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) targets at:
Assistance to groups of urban poor women for setting up gainful self employment ventures – UWSP (Loan & Subsidy). Revolving Funds for Self-Help Groups (SHGs)/ Thrift & Credit Societies (T&CSs) formed by the urban poor women – UWSP (Revolving Fund).
Further, under the Guidelines of SJSRY, it is stipulated that the percentage of women beneficiaries under USEP and STEP-UP shall not be less than 30%. Read More!
The Female Factor in India
By Heather Timmons
In New York and London, women remain scarce among top bankers despite decades of struggle to climb the corporate ladder. But in India’s relatively young financial industry, women not only are some of the top deal makers, they are often running the show.
HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS and Fidelity International in India are run by women. So is the country’s second-biggest bank, Icici Bank, and its third-largest, Axis Bank. Women head investment banking operations at Kotak Mahindra and JPMorgan Chase and the equities division of Icici. Half of the deputy governors at the Reserve Bank of India are women.
In a country where parents in some areas still prize boys over girls; where overall female literacy rates are poor; and Sania Mirza, a top tennis player, said this month that she would quit playing after marriage, the banking industry’s wealth of women in management may seem surprising. But women in the industry, many of whom have also worked in London and New York, say India provided the right combination of supportive, mostly male, managers and a diverse work environment that did not require them to be “one of the boys” to succeed.
This “isn’t a golf-playing, beer-drinking homogeneous culture,” said Naina Lal Kidwai, group managing director and country head of HSBC in India and a former head of Morgan Stanley’s investment bank in India.
Male bankers and managers run the gamut from devoutly religious to devoted family men to late-night socialites.
Women “could join the workplace on their own terms,” Ms. Kidwai said. “You still have to network, you still have to work hard, but that made it easier.”
That means India is without an old Wall Street staple: Women who feel they must act like the stereotypical male banker to advance. There are no swaggering “masters of the universe” in this group. Top female managers regularly wear saris and talk openly about their children and husbands.
These women handle many of India’s biggest deals — raising $9.7 billion for the power company NTPC or negotiating Vodafone Group’s purchase of an $11.1 billion stake in Hutchison Essar.
Almost all of them are in their 40s and 50s, are from wealthy backgrounds, went to excellent schools in India and abroad, and graduated at the top of their classes before excelling at the bank they joined. So they often enjoy the same status as the men who were their competition and their banking clients.
Banking may be more of a meritocracy than other professions, women in the business say, because there is an easy way to keep score: Look at the bottom line.
“You got your next big challenge based on your performance and your potential, not whether you were male or female,” said Chanda Kochhar, chief executive of Icici Bank, where women make up 40 percent of the senior management. Mrs. Kochhar has been at the bank for her entire 25-year career, moving from corporate to retail banking, then directing the international business before becoming chief financial officer.
Women “excel when they are subject to an open competition,” said Shyamala Gopinath, one of the Reserve Bank of India’s two female deputy governors.
India operations of big global banks constitute a tiny portion of overall profits, because debt markets and deal size and volume are smaller than in developed countries. But India’s importance has grown as investment banks bet on emerging markets for growth and simultaneously move more complicated jobs to India to cut costs at home.
So sometimes these women oversee more employees than many top managers at the banks’ headquarters.
About 11 percent of HSBC’s 331,000 employees are in India, for example, and of JPMorgan Chase’s 220,000 employees, nearly 7 percent are in India.
One in five of India’s big bank, insurance and money-management companies is headed by a woman, according to a study by the headhunting group EMA Partners. By contrast, there are no women leading major American or European banks, and no woman has ever run a Wall Street investment bank.
Bosses sometimes gravitate toward women in India because they think “women are less corruptible, more straightforward and above board most of the time,” said K. Sudarshan, managing partner, India, for EMA.
In terms of compensation, none of the women interviewed said they had ever felt they were paid a different amount than their male counterparts.
“Here salary is totally nondiscriminatory,” said Usha Thorat, the other female deputy reserve governor at India’s central bank. The idea that women might be paid less for the same job as men in the United States “came as a surprise to me,” she said.
At the same time, women in banking in India say they have always felt more pressure than men.
“Always, that is a given,” Ms. Kidwai said. “It was very clear we had to perform better and work harder.”
She added that the women now heading banks had often been the first women hired in their early jobs and had been “watched like hawks.”
And they all relied heavily on a support network of family and India’s cheap labor pool to help watch their children. Some enlisted mothers and mothers-in-law for child care for months or years, and all of them employed full-time nannies and maids.
The length of maternity leave differs from bank to bank, but the average is about three months.
Meera Sanyal, head of RBS in India, started working in India at a branch office of Grindlays Bank in Calcutta, dealing with a barrage of upset corporate customers and a unionized staff that resented her for replacing an older man. She revamped the way the bank handled clients, according to profitability; learned Bengali to communicate better with the local staff; and ultimately convinced reluctant unions to accept automation, though it would mean layoffs.
She was working at Lazard in India when she became pregnant with her first child. She recalls that when she told her boss she wanted to work flexible hours after her baby was born, he said: “Are you crazy? We’ve invested a lot of money in you.”
Rather than quit, she said, she vowed to work so hard until she gave birth that Lazard would feel it had gotten its money’s worth. She wrapped up a deal on July 6 and delivered the baby a day later. After that, her boss reconsidered, allowing her to work flexible hours for the same pay. There are several men, she said, who “made it possible for me to do what I wanted to do.”
Now she is doing the same for other women at the bank. Recently, a risk manager said she needed to quit because she was pregnant and had been prescribed bed rest. Ms. Sanyal suggested that the bank set up a home office instead that would allow her to work from bed. After having a healthy baby, “she’s back at work and absolutely a star performer,” Ms. Sanyal said.
“Small things like that cost us nothing,” she added. “It is just a way of being more flexible.”
Kalpana Morparia, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase in India, had some simple advice for Western banks that are trying to increase the number of women at the top. “Just be gender neutral,” she said. “Men are just as smart as we are.”
The article was published in NYTimes on 27 January, 2010 Read More!
World Heritage Site (WHS) in India
Sites of outstanding value to humanity that are to be protected and for posterity are considered as World Heritage Sites. Conservation of such sites is embodied in an international treaty called the Convention concerning the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, adopted by UNESCO in 1972.
Cultural Heritage Site
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science. groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.
Cultural Heritage Sites in India
1. Ajanta Caves (1983)
2. Buddhist Monuments at Sanchi (1989)
3. Champaner-Pavagadh Archaeological Park (2004)
4. Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (formerly Victoria Terminus) (2004)
5. Churches and Convents of Goa (1986)
6. Elephanta Caves (1987)
7. Ellora Caves (1983)
8. Fatehpur Sikri (1986)
9. Great Living Chola Temples (1987)
10. Group of Monuments at Hampi (1986)
11. Group of Monuments at Mahabalipuram (1984)
12. Group of Monuments at Pattadakal (1987)
13. Humayun's Tomb, Delhi (1993)
14. Khajuraho Group of Monuments (1986)
15. Mahabodhi Temple Complex at Bodh Gaya (2002)
16. Mountain Railways of India (1999)
17. Qutb Minar and its Monuments, Delhi (1993)
18. Red Fort Complex (2007)
19. Rock Shelters of Bhimbetka (2003)
20. Sun Temple, Konârak (1984)
21. Taj Mahal (1983)
Natural Heritage Site
natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view;geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation;natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.
Natural Heritage Sites in India
1. Kaziranga National Park (1985)
2. Keoladeo National Park (1985)
3. Manas Wildlife Sanctuary (1985)
4. Nanda Devi and Valley of Flowers National Parks (1988)
5. Sundarbans National Park (1987)
Properties submitted on the Tentative List
* Temples at Bishnupur, West Bengal (1998)
* Buddhist Monastery Complex, Alchi, Leh, known as Alchi Chos-kor (1998)
* Golconda Fort, Hyderbad, Andhra Pradesh (1998)
* Dholavira: a Harappan City, Gujarat, Disstt, Kachchh (1998)
* Rani-ki-Vav (The Queen's Stepwell) at Patan, Gujarat (1998)
* Mattanchery Palace, Ernakulam, Kerala (1998)
* Tomb of Sher Shah Suri, Sasaram, Bihar (1998)
* Group of Monuments at Mandu, Madhya Pradesh (1998)
* Ancient Buddhist Site, Sarnath, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh (1998)
* Hemis Gompa (1998)
* Sri Harimandir Sahib, Amritsar, Punjab (2004)
* River Island of Majuli in midstream of Brahmaputra River in Assam (2004)
* Kalka Shimla Railway (2004)
* The Matheran Light Railway (extension to the Mountain Railways of India) (2005)
* Western Ghats (sub cluster nomination) (2006)
* Namdapha National Park (2006)
* Wild Ass Sanctuary, Little Rann of Kutch (2006)
* Kangchendzonga National Park (2006)
* Urban and Architectural Work of Le Corbusier in Chandigarh (2006)
* The Kangra Valley Railway - Extension to the Mountain Railways of India (2009)
* Churchgate - Extension to Mumbai CST (2009)
* The Maharaja Railways of India (2009)
* Oak Grove School (2009)
* Excavated Remains at Nalanda (2009)
* The Jantar Mantars : Astronomical Observatories of India (2009)
* Great Himalayan National Park (2009)
* Bhitarkanika Conservation Area (2009)
* Neora Valley National Park (2009)
* Desert National Park (2009)
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Cultural Heritage Site
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science. groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.
Cultural Heritage Sites in India
1. Ajanta Caves (1983)
2. Buddhist Monuments at Sanchi (1989)
3. Champaner-Pavagadh Archaeological Park (2004)
4. Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (formerly Victoria Terminus) (2004)
5. Churches and Convents of Goa (1986)
6. Elephanta Caves (1987)
7. Ellora Caves (1983)
8. Fatehpur Sikri (1986)
9. Great Living Chola Temples (1987)
10. Group of Monuments at Hampi (1986)
11. Group of Monuments at Mahabalipuram (1984)
12. Group of Monuments at Pattadakal (1987)
13. Humayun's Tomb, Delhi (1993)
14. Khajuraho Group of Monuments (1986)
15. Mahabodhi Temple Complex at Bodh Gaya (2002)
16. Mountain Railways of India (1999)
17. Qutb Minar and its Monuments, Delhi (1993)
18. Red Fort Complex (2007)
19. Rock Shelters of Bhimbetka (2003)
20. Sun Temple, Konârak (1984)
21. Taj Mahal (1983)
Natural Heritage Site
natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view;geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation;natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.
Natural Heritage Sites in India
1. Kaziranga National Park (1985)
2. Keoladeo National Park (1985)
3. Manas Wildlife Sanctuary (1985)
4. Nanda Devi and Valley of Flowers National Parks (1988)
5. Sundarbans National Park (1987)
Properties submitted on the Tentative List
* Temples at Bishnupur, West Bengal (1998)
* Buddhist Monastery Complex, Alchi, Leh, known as Alchi Chos-kor (1998)
* Golconda Fort, Hyderbad, Andhra Pradesh (1998)
* Dholavira: a Harappan City, Gujarat, Disstt, Kachchh (1998)
* Rani-ki-Vav (The Queen's Stepwell) at Patan, Gujarat (1998)
* Mattanchery Palace, Ernakulam, Kerala (1998)
* Tomb of Sher Shah Suri, Sasaram, Bihar (1998)
* Group of Monuments at Mandu, Madhya Pradesh (1998)
* Ancient Buddhist Site, Sarnath, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh (1998)
* Hemis Gompa (1998)
* Sri Harimandir Sahib, Amritsar, Punjab (2004)
* River Island of Majuli in midstream of Brahmaputra River in Assam (2004)
* Kalka Shimla Railway (2004)
* The Matheran Light Railway (extension to the Mountain Railways of India) (2005)
* Western Ghats (sub cluster nomination) (2006)
* Namdapha National Park (2006)
* Wild Ass Sanctuary, Little Rann of Kutch (2006)
* Kangchendzonga National Park (2006)
* Urban and Architectural Work of Le Corbusier in Chandigarh (2006)
* The Kangra Valley Railway - Extension to the Mountain Railways of India (2009)
* Churchgate - Extension to Mumbai CST (2009)
* The Maharaja Railways of India (2009)
* Oak Grove School (2009)
* Excavated Remains at Nalanda (2009)
* The Jantar Mantars : Astronomical Observatories of India (2009)
* Great Himalayan National Park (2009)
* Bhitarkanika Conservation Area (2009)
* Neora Valley National Park (2009)
* Desert National Park (2009)
